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The National Stolen Property Act and
Computer Files: A New Form of Property, a

New Form of Theft
Todd H. Flamingt
Section 2314 of the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA")
imposes a fine and a jail sentence on any person who "transports,
transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted
or taken by fraud."' In Dowling v United States, the Supreme
Court held that the Act's "stolen, converted or taken by fraud"
language did not extend to a case of pure copyright infringement.2 Although ostensibly a case about whether copyright
infringement is equivalent to stealing, converting or taking by
fraud, the opinion contains hints that the NSPA does not apply
at all to the taking of purely intangible property.
What happens to a person who uses his computer to connect
to another person's computer without permission through the use
of a modem and instructs that person's computer to download a
confidential file?3 Like pure copyright infringement, there is not
the kind of "physical" taking involved that there would be were
the person to break into the victim's home and steal data disks.
However, unlike pure copyright infringement, an uninvited intrusion into the victim's privacy occurs, albeit through the use of
analog signals over the phone lines.
BA. 1988, Loyola Marymount; J.D. 1993, The University of Chicago. The author is
currently an associate with Schopf & Weiss in Chicago.
1 National Stolen Property Act, 18 USC § 2314 (1990) (the "Act" or "NSPA).
2 Dowling v United States, 473 US 207, 228 (1985).
Using a personal computer attached to a device called a "modem" (modulator/demodulator), any person can use phone lines to connect to another computer that also
has a modem which is waiting to answer incoming calls. The modem translates digital
information (the computer's information) into analog signals and broadcasts them over a
phone line. The receiving modem answers the phone, waits for a signal that another
computer is calling (like a fax machine), and then establishes a link. Once connected, the
caller can usually instruct the answering computer to list the computer files it contains
and to send them over the phone line to his computer.
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Lower courts confronting this problem have read Dowling in
two conflicting ways. One side considers Dowling a case about
tangibility and holds that for a person's misconduct to fall under
the NSPA, he must take a "physical thing" from someone else
and transport that thing across state lines. The other side reads
Dowling as a case about copyrights, holding that copyright
infringement is better left to the copyright laws than to statutes
dealing with stolen property.
This Comment argues that the latter view is preferable. The
Dowling opinion stresses the existence of another federal statutory scheme-the copyright laws-that covers cases of pure copyright infringement. The opinion argues that the existence of such
a scheme evidences an intent to deal with copyrights exclusively
through that scheme.4 While courts have generally been reluctant to recognize complex forms of property, a great deal of case
law interpreting the NSPA extends its coverage well beyond the
realm of purely physical property. To read into the NSPA the requirement of physical tangibility creates incongruities in its
application with some absurd results. To read the NSPA to cover
theft via modem fits with the purposes of the Act. More importantly, reading the NSPA to cover computer files provides a
foundation for preserving basic property rights at a time when
society is on the verge of abandoning paper as a medium of
storage.
Part I of this Comment outlines the Dowling decision and
the lower court decisions confronting theft over the phone lines.
Part II addresses the arguments of the lower courts interpreting
Dowling as applied to theft of computer files and concludes that
Dowling is more properly read as a case about copyrights, not a
case about tangibility. Part III argues that the purpose of the
NSPA is consistent with that reading of Dowling and that recognition of property rights in computer files will be essential to
preserving the current status of property rights that courts
recognize in information. Finally, Part IV applies the NSPA to a
hypothetical case of theft via modem and addresses the question
of valuation.

' Dowling, 473 US at 228.
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I. DOWLING AND THE COMPUTER FILE THEFT CASES

A. Dowling
In Dowling v United States,5 the Supreme Court held that
mere copyright infringement does not constitute stealing, converting or taking by fraud as defined in the NSPA. The defendant compiled a collection of bootleg recordings of Elvis Presley
songs and subsequently transported the phonorecords across
state lines.6 The government argued that the act of infringing a
copyright is sufficiently similar to stealing, converting, or defrauding someone out of property that the NSPA should apply to
transporting phonorecords which contain material in violation of
the copyright statute. The Court refused to consider the
government's second argument that Dowling had "obtained the
source material through illicit means."7 Therefore, the
government's only argument was that Dowling's unauthorized
use of recordings to which he had legitimate access was a form of
theft.'
The Court rejected the government's comparison of copyright
infringement with stealing and noted that all cases interpreting
the NSPA involved physical goods, wares or merchandise that
were themselves stolen.9 The opinion then reasoned that the
NSPA's requirement that the goods, wares or merchandise be
"'the same' as those 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' seems
clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items
unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence
some prior physical taking of the subject goods." °

r 473 US 207.
6

Id at 210-11.

' Id at 215 n 7. The Court chose to ignore this alternative basis for finding statutory
theft for three reasons. First, the counts in the indictment upon which Dowling was
convicted contained only allegations of copyright infringement. Second, the Ninth Circuit
on appeal based its decision solely on copyright infringement as opposed to "any theory of
illegal procurement." Third, even if the stipulated testimony had contained enough evidence to establish wrongful procurement of the source material, no one had addressed the
evidentiary issue of valuation up to that point. Id.
' There was no argument "that Dowling wrongfully came by the phonorecords
actually shipped or the physical materials from which they were made," or "that the
objects that Dowling caused to be shipped, the bootleg phonorecords, were 'the same' as
the copyrights in the musical compositions that he infringed by unauthorized distribution
of Presley performances of those compositions." Id at 214.
" Id at 216.
10 Id.

258

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

(1993:

The Court devoted the remainder of the opinion to addressing the unique characteristics of a copyright. It pointed out that a
copyright "comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully
delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact
protections." 1 It observed that a copyright owner does not have
complete control over the copyright, that § 107 of the Copyright
Act contains a "fair use" exception and that § 115 grants compulsory licenses in nondramatic musical works.12 The Court also
pointed out that one who arrogates the use of an author's protected work neither assumes "physical control over the copyright"
nor "wholly deprive[s] its owner of its use."13 The Court concluded that copyright infringement "fits but awkwardly within the
language Congress chose [in the NSPAI.""

Having decided that copyright infringement fits awkwardly
within the statutory language, the Court considered the purposes
of the NSPA. It noted that the NSPA serves to fill the gaps
where state enforcement is inadequate to address a particular
type of crime and that federal law already fills the gap where
copyright infringement is concerned."5 The Court noted: "the
premise of § 2314-the need to fill with federal action an enforcement chasm created by limited state jurisdiction-simply does
not apply to the conduct the Government seeks to reach here."6
The Court found an additional reason to hesitate before extending the NSPA to cover this case in Congress's reliance on principally civil remedies where copyright infringement is concerned. 7
In short, the Court found copyright infringement to be sufficiently different from stealing, converting and taking by fraud that
the NSPA should not apply to it.
B. Computer File Theft
The holding in Dowling is unclear. Although purportedly a
case about the meaning of "stolen, converted or taken by fraud,"
the "physical taking" language can be read to suggest that only
physical goods come under the protection of the NSPA. Does that

"

Id.

,2 Id at 217, citing Harper & Row, Publishers v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 547
(1985).
" Dowling, 473 US at 217.
14

Id at 218.

,s Id at 220-21.
16 Id at 221.
17 Id at 221-25.
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mean that files on a computer do not come under the protection
of the NSPA? Two recent cases have reached opposite conclusions
in interpreting the Dowling decision as applied to this question.
1. United States v Riggs.
Two men, Riggs and Neidorf, devised a plan to acquire Bell
South Telephone Company's E911 file that was stored on Bell
South's computer system in Atlanta." The E911 file was a text
file that contained Bell South's procedures for installation, operation, and maintenance of emergency 911 services; services for
handling emergency calls to police, fire, ambulance; and other
emergency services for municipalities. Using a computer with a
modem, Riggs dialed into Bell South's computer without authorization and downloaded 9 the file. Riggs used other people's account numbers and passwords both to gain access to the computer and to disguise himself while online. Riggs then uploaded the
file over an interstate network to a bulletin board in Lockport,
Illinois. ° Neidorf downloaded the file from the Lockport bulletin
board, altered it and later published the altered version in his
newsletter, Phrack.2 1 The government alleged that the file was
worth about eighty thousand dollars, well above the NSPA mini22
mum.

Counts III and IV of the indictment charged Riggs and.
Neidorf with violating § 2314.' The court rejected Neidorfs argument that he did not fall within the NSPA because he only
sent electric impulses over the wire. The court likened the trans-

18 United States v Riggs, 739 F Supp 414, 416-17 (N D IlM 1990). The facts are set out

at pages 416-17.
"8 "Downloading" means instructing the computer a person calls to send a computer
file over a modem to that person's computer. The opposite, "uploading," involves sending a
file to the computer called over the modem. See Riggs, 739 F Supp at 417 n 3.
'0 A bulletin board is a computer which users can call using a computer with a
modem. The board allows users to upload files for others to use or to download files others
have left there. For a good discussion of the workings of bulletin boards, see Elizabeth
McGinnis, BBS 101, Online Access 6 (May 1993).
21 Neidorf sent the file back to the bulletin board for Riggs' approval before publish-

ing it.
' For an excellent discussion of the case, see Bruce Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown
250-82 (Bantam Books, 1992), which contains a copy of the edited version of the E911 file
at pages 262-73. The file contains very little technical information and is primarily an
administrative document. The government's figure appears to have been far off the mark.
During the trial the defense introduced evidence that, to the surprise of a testifying
prosecution witness, the information was available to the public for about thirteen dollars.
Id at 282.
' Previous counts charged the defendants with wire fraud.
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fer of the text file over the line to the transfer of money by wire,
which 24courts had previously found to be encompassed by the
NSPA.
The more interesting question in Riggs was whether the
proprietary information contained in the E911 text file constituted "goods, wares or merchandise" under the Act. The court noted
that the law was well-settled that the NSPA applied to theft of a
tangible medium where intangible property was attached to
it-for example, a chemical formula written on a piece of paper.' The court then reasoned that using a modem to steal the
information, rather than Bell South's own data disk, should be no
different. 26 The court distinguished Dowling on the ground that
the Dowling Court never construed the meaning of "goods, wares
[or] merchandise. '27 Additionally, the Riggs court reasoned that
to read a tangibility requirement into the definition of "goods,
wares [or] merchandise" would lead to absurd results. The court
provided an example of such an absurd result: the NSPA would
not apply to a trucker who steals a colorless, odorless, tasteless
gas by pumping it into his truck and transporting it across state
lines.28
As to whether the text file was "stolen, converted or taken by
fraud," the court distinguished Dowling by reading the case as a
case about copyrights: "As Dowling and Smith recognized, the
copyright holder owns only a bundle of intangible rights which
can be infringed, but not stolen or converted. The owner of confidential, proprietary business information, in contrast, possesses
something which has clearly been recognized as an item of property."29 The court also rejected Neidorfs argument that, like the
Copyright Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was intended
to be the only statute governing the area of computer abuse. The

24 Riggs, 739 F Supp at 420.

Riggs, 739 F Supp at 420-21. The court cited United States v Greenwald, 479 F2d
320, 322 (6th Cir 1973) (chemical formulae attached to piece of paper); United States v
Bottone, 365 F2d 389, 393 (2d Cir 1966) (patented process attached to piece of paper);
United States v Lester, 282 F2d 750, 754-55 (3d Cir 1960) (geophysical maps); and United
States v Seagraves, 265 F2d 876 (3d Cir 1959) (same facts as Lester).
26 Riggs, 739 F Supp at 420-21.
Id at 421 n 9.
28

Id at 421.

29

Id at 422-23.
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court looked to the legislative history and found no evidence that
Congress intended it to be the exclusive statute governing computer crime.m°
2. United States v Brown.
The Tenth Circuit reached a conclusion opposite that of
Riggs, finding that computer source code 3 does not constitute
"goods, wares, [or] merchandise" under the NSPA Brown left
employment as a programmer with a company called The Software Link ("TSL"). Federal investigators later obtained a warrant to search Brown's home and found a hard disk and three
binders containing the source code for PC-MOS/386, a computer
program developed by TSL. Because the government could not
prove that Brown stole the hard disk from TSL, the court assumed that Brown merely copied the code onto his own disk.
The Tenth Circuit held that in light of Dowling, the NSPA
does not apply to purely intangible property."3 The government's
argument attempted to distinguish the case from Dowling on the
ground that Brown, unlike the defendant in Dowling, must have
physically taken the code from TSL, as TSL never released the
source code to anyone in the public.3 4 The court rejected this
argument, because it read Dowling as holding that the NSPA
only applies to "physical 'goods, wares or merchandise.' 3 5 The
opinion made no attempt to distinguish Riggs on the basis of the
type of computer file stolen (for example, a source code file instead of a text file). Hence, the Brown opinion is directly contrary
to the Riggs holding.
II. WHAT DOWLING REALLY MEANS

Whether the NSPA applies at all to a case of pure computer
file theft depends on whether one adopts the Riggs or Brown
Id at 423.

'o

3 In general, source code is just a text file with a computer program written in it in a
language that human beings can read (or stored in a binary format, but able to be read by
human beings with the use of a translator). When the programmer is finished, he "compiles" the source code file with a "compiler," turning it into binary language that the
computer can read. At that point the source code text file has been transformed into a
workable computer program.
' United States v Brown, 925 F2d 1301, 1308-09 (10th Cir 1991). The facts of the
case appear at pages 1302-03, and 1305-07.
3

Id.

Id at 1307.
3 Id at 1308-09.
'
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reading of Dowling. The Riggs opinion suggests that Dowling is
only a case about copyrights. Under this reading, there is room to
use § 2314 to prosecute a person for transporting or transmitting
unauthorized copies of computer files across state lines. However,
the Brown opinion suggests that Dowling limits the application
of the NSPA to cases involving theft of some tangible item. Under this reading, the only possible prosecutions are those for
items such as stolen data disks. For example, assume an employee steals a source code file worth well in excess of $5,000 from
his company and moves to a new state. Under the Riggs reading
of Dowling, the NSPA applies to his conduct. However, under the
Brown reading of Dowling, whether the NSPA applies or not
turns on whether he travelled across state lines with the files on
his own diskettes or the company's diskettes. Under Brown's
reading, in other words, one can avoid prosecution under the
NSPA by simply copying the files onto his own diskette.
The Riggs reading of Dowling makes sense. While some of
the language in Dowling about tangibility lends support to the
Tenth Circuit's argument in Brown, the relevant language is in
dicta and none of it directly limits the Act's application to physical goods. Furthermore, requiring tangibility under the NSPA
casts doubt on a long line of cases holding that electronic funds
transfers fit under the NSPA. Moreover, viewed in a broader context, it appears that the Dowling Court was getting at something
other than naked tangibility.
A. Separate Elements of the Violation
The Brown opinion obscures the distinction between the
issue of whether an item is the sort of property covered by the
statute and the issue of whether the acts used to acquire an
interest in that property are covered by the statute. However, it
is important to distinguish the two and to address the elements
of a NSPA violation separately.
The Court in Dowling defined the elements of a violation of
the NSPA:
Section 2314 requires, first, that the defendant have transported "goods, wares, [or] merchandise" in interstate or foreign commerce; second, that those goods have a value of
"$5,000 or more"; and, third, that the defendant "kno[w] the
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same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 6
Because the Court emphasized the need for precision in construing criminal statutes,37 and because it stressed that the elements of the violation are separate, interpretation of Dowling
requires a careful reading of the opinion with respect to both.
1. Goods, Wares or Merchandise.
The Tenth Circuit in Brown started with the premise that
"Dowlingholds that § 2314 applies only to physical 'goods, wares
or merchandise.' Purely intellectual property is not within this
category." 3 However, two aspects of Dowling suggest that the
Brown court overstated the holding of the case. First, the
Dowling Court only addressed the issue of whether the copyright
infringement at issue fit within the language of "stolen, converted or taken by fraud."39 The Court never had to decide what the
phrase "goods, wares [or] merchandise" means. Further, Dowling
never challenged that the items were goods under the statute.0
Therefore, any language in the opinion to the effect that the
statute only covers tangible "goods, wares or merchandise" is
dictum.
More importantly, the Dowling Court never actually stated
that only tangible goods fit under the NSPA. Brown cites to page
216 of the Dowling opinion for its conclusion that the Court held
that the phrase "goods, wares [or] merchandise" only includes

Dowling, 473 US at 214 (emphasis added).
" Id at 213 ("[Wlhen assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, we must pay
close heed to language, legislative history, and purpose in order strictly to determine the
scope of the conduct the enactment forbids.").
' Brown, 925 F2d at 1307. The Brown court is not alone in this conclusion. See Note,
The National Stolen Property Act and its Applicability to Property Rights in Computer
Source Code-Do Rights Exist?-United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991),
11 Temple Envir L & Tech J 155 (1992).
" The court stated: "We must determine, therefore, whether phonorecords that
include the performance of copyrighted musical compositions for the use of which no
authorization has been sought nor royalties paid are consequently 'stolen, converted or
taken by fraud' for purposes of § 2314." Dowling, 473 US at 215-16.
"0 The opinion notes: "Dowling does not contest that he caused the shipment of goods
in interstate commerce, or that the shipments had sufficient value to meet the monetary
requirement. He argues, instead, that the goods shipped were not 'stolen, converted or
taken by fraud.'" Id at 215. If Dowling meant to argue that the records themselves were
not stolen, but that what was stolen, the intellectual property, was not "goods," he might
have made this argument directly. There was no dispute that Dowling did not steal the
material used to makes the records. Therefore, everyone understood that Dowling was not
being prosecuted for theft of the records themselves. The issue in the case was whether
the intellectual property was "stolen" through the process of copyright infringement.
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tangible items. The relevant portion of that page contains no direct statement to that effect. The relevant passage reads: "But
these cases and others prosecuted under § 2314 have always
involved physical 'goods, wares, [or] merchandise' that have
themselves been 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud.'"41 This
passage refers only to previous cases. Before the Dowling decision there were no decisions about theft of computer files. Moreover, the statement is inclusive, but not necessarily exclusive.
The sentence does not say: "As has always been the case, to fit
under the Act goods must be tangible." In fact, the Court did not
use the term "tangible" or "physical" in order to modify or limit
the phrase "goods, wares [or] merchandise" anywhere in the
opinion.
Therefore, although the Brown court read Dowling to hold
that the phrase "goods, wares, [or] merchandise" includes only
tangible items, the Dowling opinion does not support such a
reading. Given the Dowling Court's careful statement of the issue
before it 42 and its emphasis on the need to be precise in construing a criminal statute,43 the Riggs court's reading of Dowling on
goods, wares or merchandise is more accurate.
2. Stolen, Converted or Taken by Fraud.
It is more plausible to read Dowling as holding that under
the NSPA only tangible items may be "stolen, converted or taken
by fraud," than that the goods, wares or merchandise themselves
must be tangible. The Dowling Court noted:
by requiring that the 'goods, wares, [or] merchandise' be 'the
same' as those 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud,' the provision seems clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually
transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the
subject goods.4
This statement comes close to holding that only a taking of physical goods falls under the meaning of "stolen, converted or taken
by fraud."
However, such a reading is problematic for three reasons.

4' Id at 216.
42 Id at 215-16.

4 Id at 213.
Id at 216 (emphasis added).
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First, the opinion contains no direct language stating that only
physical goods may be taken. The phrase "physical taking, of
subject goods" is strikingly different from a possible alternative
wording: "taking of physical goods." In other words, "physical
taking" is not equivalent to a taking of physical goods. This reading makes sense given the next sentence in the opinion: "In contrast, the Government's theory here would make theft, conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of statutorily
protected rights in copyright."4 5 The act of "physical[ly] taking"
appears to be something "[i]n contrast" to an act of purely wrongful appropriation as defined in the copyright statute.46
Second, reading Dowling as grafting a requirement of a taking of physical goods onto the NSPA is problematic, because the
opinion assumes that Dowling had proper access to the recordings.. The opinion carefully assumes away any facts suggesting
that Dowling came across the recordings through illicit means.
The Court noted:
The Government argues in the alternative that even if the
unauthorized use of copyrighted musical compositions does
not alone render the phonorecords contained in these shipments 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud,' the record contains evidence amply establishing that the bootleggers obtained the source material through illicit means.... For
several reasons, we decline to consider this alternative basis
for upholding Dowling's convictions.4 7
In other words, the Court took the case on the assumption that
Dowling did not use illicit means to acquire the Presley recordings. Because the Court explicitly refused to address the
issue of whether "illicit means" of acquiring the intangible property might result in a different decision, the question is, at a

45 Id.
46 Perhaps a valid distinction between theft via modem or copying and copyright in-

fringement is the reverse of Neidorf's own argument (Neidorf was a defendant in the
Riggs case): that electric impulses carrying the file over the phone line or onto the disk actually are tangible items, and causing them to flow over the wire or onto the disk is a
form of "physical taking" or carrying off in a way that merely infringing a copyright

(which involves no similar form of physical carrying off) is not.
"' Dowling, 473 US at 215 n 7 (emphasis added). The Court refused to consider the
Government's alternative argument; because the counts in the indictment were founded
exclusively on copyright infringement, the Court of Appeals rested its decision solely on
copyright infringement, and even if there had been enough evidence in the record to
support the argument, no one had addressed the issue of valuation under the alternative
theory.Id.
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minimum, still open."
Third, reading Dowling as requiring a taking of physical
goods is problematic, because the Dowling Court devoted the majority of its attention to the nature of a copyright as something
distinct from a right to property under the common law. The
Court addressed the narrow issue of whether copyright infringement constitutes stealing, converting or taking by fraud under
the statute. The Court was never asked to address anything more
than that. The Court's narrow focus on copyright suggests that
any language applying the case to something beyond copyright is
dictum.
The narrow focus on copyright also means that the case can
be read as holding only that the extensive statutory scheme set
up to create, regulate and enforce copyright protection was designed to operate as a closed system. Three aspects of the Court's
reasoning support this argument. First, the Court addressed the
history and purpose of the NSPA, concluding that "the premise of
§ 2314-the need to fill with federal action an enforcement chasm
created by limited state jurisdiction-simply does not apply" to
copyright infringement.4 9 The Court based this conclusion on the
observation that the Constitution grants Congress the authority
to legislate directly in the area of copyrights and that Congress
did so by carefully defining both the rights and their enforcement
in the Copyright Act.5 ° Second, the Court went further, basing
its holding on the history of copyright infringement provisions as
chiefly providing civil remedies and providing criminal remedies

48 One might argue that this alone distinguishes the case from a case of pure comput-

er file theft. In other words, copyright infringement is different from gaining control over
property without authorized access to the material. Consider three examples: (1) an unauthorized intruder steals the victim's car from his house; (2) an unauthorized intruder
copies the victim's computer files onto the intruder's own disks and leaves with the disks;
(3) a record producer fails to seek permission when he records a song to which he had
proper access. If we ask whether something was "tak[en]" as the Supreme Court understands the concept in the Dowling opinion, the answer is unclear. However, in the first
two cases the thief gains unauthorized access to the victim's premises. Indeed, the Brown
opinion recognizes this problem: "It is true that the intellectual property involved in the
instant case was more nearly 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' in the sense that it was
at no time freely presented to the public as had been the recordings in Dowling." Brown,
925 F2d at 1307-08. However this distinction is shaky. First, it does not account for a case
of pure conversion (for example, an employee who fails to return backup disks of company
files after he is fired and no longer has a right to possess them). Second, the physical act
of recording without permission copyrighted material to which one has proper access is in
itself a form of unauthorized access.
'9 Id at 221.
'0 Id at 218-21.

2551

Computer Files

only after careful deliberation.51
Third, the Court used as an example a case of pure copyright
infringement with no reference to illicit taking of the property.
The Court, toward the end of its opinion, noted that extending
the NSPA might have "broad consequences.., both in the field
of copyright and in kindred fields of intellectual property law."52
The Court offered a hypothetical case involving a case of copyright infringement which it considered to be out of the reach of
the NSPA. The hypothetical case involved The Nation magazine
publishing excerpts from President Ford's unpublished memoirs.
Notably, the Court did not mention how The Nation acquired the
manuscript, but stressed only the copyright violation.53
Although full of language suggesting that intellectual property does not fall under the scope of the NSPA, Dowling contains
no language explicitly limiting the NSPA to a taking of physical
goods. Also, the opinion explicitly limits its holding to a case in
which the copyright infringer did not gain access to the material
through illicit means. Most importantly, Dowling is devoted primarily to establishing that the copyright statute does not contain
enforcement gaps, and is designed to operate as a closed system.
Given this reading of Dowling, the Brown court's conclusion that
the NSPA cannot cover intangible property may be premature.
B. Other Intangible Property Cases
There is dicta in Dowling that supports the Brown court's
conclusion that the NSPA does not apply to intangible property.
However, good reas6ns exist to believe that the Dowling holding
was not intended to reach beyond copyright law. If one were to
accept the Brown reading, Dowling narrows application of the
NSPA to the taking and transportation of physical objects. If so,
Dowling either overrules a long line of cases applying the NSPA
to electronic funds transfers or renders application of the NSPA
anomalous. Also, under this reading, in intangible property cases
the NSPA protects only the medium (the diskette) and not the
message (the file).

51 Id at 221-26.
152 Id
53

Id.

at 226.

268

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

[1993:

1. Wire Transfer Cases.
The difficulty with reading the Dowling case to hold that
only physical goods may be taken is that it runs counter to a line
of cases reaching the opposite conclusion. In an early case, United States v Levy,54 the Fifth Circuit held that the NSPA was
broad enough to account for a change in form of securities moved
into interstate commerce. The defendant wrote checks from a
company bank account and deposited them into a bank account
across state lines. The defendant was technically authorized to
write the check, but did not have permission to do so.5 He argued that while the money itself may have been obtained by
fraud, because he had authority to write the checks, the checks
themselves were not obtained by fraud.56 The court, rejecting his
characterization, reasoned:
Read literally the statute would require that the very object
taken by fraud be transported in interstate commerce. However, such a narrow reading of the statute would clearly
frustrate the purpose of Congress: Congress had in mind
preventing further frauds or the completion of frauds partially executed.57
Consistent with this reasoning, in Lagerquist v United States,58
the court held that bank checks fit within the language of the
NSPA, even though they were not stolen, but obtained through
the sale of fraudulently obtained goods.
In a more recent case, United States v Kroh,59 the Eighth
Circuit held that funds obtained through wire transfer directly
from a defrauded bank were covered under the NSPA's "stolen,
converted or taken by fraud" language. The defendant in Kroh
used fraudulent financial statements to obtain loans from three
banks. He had the banks directly deposit the loan funds electronically to his bank in another state." The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the NSPA did not apply because he
never had physical possession of the money before it was trans-

-

579 F2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir 1978).
Id at 1335-36.
Id at 1335-37.
'7
Id at 1337.
820 F2d 969, 971 (8th Cir 1987).
59 896 F2d 1524, 1529, rehearing granted, vacated on other grounds, 904 F2d 450
(1990).
' Id at 1526-28.
'5
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ferred across state lines. The court found that while there was no
physical taking of the funds, the means used to obtain the goods
were irrelevant."' The court cited a passage in an earlier case,
United States v Gilboe, which also involved an electronic wiring
of funds: "we suspect that actual dollars rarely move between
banks.... If anything, the means of transfer here were essential
to the success of the fraudulent scheme."'62 In response to the
defendant's argument that Dowling precluded such a conclusion,
the Kroh court explained:
The statement [in Dowling] on which Kroh relies ("the provision seems clearly to contemplate.., some prior physical
taking of the subject goods") is not indicative of a requirement that literal possession occur prior to the act of transportation. Rather, it suggests only that copyright infringement does not result in the property deprivation that section
2314 is intended to punish.""3
To read Dowling to apply only where the defendant had possessed physical goods would be to open a loophole in the NSPA
for theft via electronic transfer. Because the Court has never
granted certiorari to any of the longstanding series of cases
reaching the same result," the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in
Kroh that the case should be read as a case about copyrights is
reasonable.
In order for a court to avoid overruling the wire transfer
cases, it would have to distinguish computer files. Why computer
files should be singled out is something the Brown court did not
answer. Computer files store information traditionally stored in
other media. Money is transferred between banks through the
use of bookkeeping entries without ever moving a physical equivalent in cash.65 To treat theft of computer files without taking of
physical goods differently than theft of money via wire transfer
would be anomalous.

61 Id at 1529; see also United States v Goldberg, 830 F2d 459 (3d Cir 1987); United
States v Wright, 791 F2d 133 (10th Cir 1986); United States v Gilboe, 684 F2d 235 (2d Cir
1982).
62 Kroh, 896 F2d at 1529, citing Gilboe, 684 F2d at 238.
' Kroh, 896 F2d at 1529, citing Dowling, 473 US at 217-18.
4 See, for example, United States v Gilboe, 684 F2d 235 (2d Cir 1982), cert denied,
459 US 1201 (1983).
' Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law and Regulation 53-54
(Little, Brown, 1992) ("EFT avoids the inefficiencies and delay associated with the physical transport of checks.").
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2. Medium Versus Message.
The Brown conclusion also has the odd result of punishing
theft via a particular medium regardless of the message. For
example, assume Thief I uses his own diskette to steal a computer file worth $10,001, and Thief 2 steals a diskette worth $1
containing a file worth $10,000. Under the Brown reading of
Dowling, Thief 2 may be prosecuted under the NSPA for theft of
$10,001 worth of property, while Thief 1 may not be prosecuted
under the NSPA at all.66 Yet all other things equal, the conduct
of the first thief results in the same social loss.
Once a component of the property, no matter how small,
meets the tangibility requirement, the remaining components, no
matter how intangible, are considered property under the NSPA.
Even where almost the entire value of the item transported is
attributable to its intangible component, the item is considered
property under the Act, and taking the item renders it stolen as
defined by the Act. In United States v Bottone,"7 the Second Circuit relied upon trade secret law in confirming a conviction for
interstate transportation of stolen property where the defendants
transported across state lines copies of a manufacturing process
for bacterial cultures along with actual bacterial cultures. The
court found sufficient physical connection between goods stolen
and goods transported because of the carrying of the actual bacterial cultures across state lines, but rejected the need for such
an analysis.68 A broad reading of Bottone suggests that transporting between states a copy of the information explaining the
process alone (without transporting any stolen physical object)
satisfies the NSPA's property requirement. To what extent the
broad reading of the case is good law after Dowling is unclear.
But the Dowling opinion cited with approval United States v
Greenwald,69 which held that a piece of paper containing chemical formulae can be considered "goods, wares, [or] merchandise"
under the Act, even though the paper itself was almost worthless
without the formulae. 0
Perhaps the court was trying to draw a line between the case

I borrow this example from one given to me by Professor David Friedman.
Friedman's example uses $20,000 for the value to Thief 1. I use different values to illustrate the lack of any economic difference between the cases.
" United States v Bottone, 365 F2d 389, 393 (2d Cir 1966).
6 Id at 393-94.
"' Greenwald, 479 F2d at 322.
7' Dowling, 473 US at 216.
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where the piece of paper itself (probably worth a few pennies)
was stolen and where the piece of paper was not stolen. But, as
the Eighth Circuit, in its post-Dowling Kroh opinion reasoned,
"[tihe aim of the statute is to punish the act of fraud; the method
by which the perpetrator transports the fruits of the fraud in
interstate commerce is irrelevant."7 ' That the method of transportation has no important consequences suggests that Dowling
should be read as a case about copyright law, and not as a case
importing a tangibility requirement into the NSPA.
HI. READING THE NSPA TO COVER COMPUTER FILES
That computer files lack common law intellectual property
protection is no surprise. We are only beginning to see the largescale use of computers, and the computer itself is a relatively
recent technology. To expect the common law to have adapted to
this new technology is roughly equivalent chronologically to expecting the common law to have adapted to the use of outer
space.
On the other hand, waiting for law, either state or federal, to
fill the gap is problematic. A uniform state common law defining
the status of computer files does not exist and probably will not
exist for some time.72 Computer crimes can be, and often are,
easily accomplished across jurisdictional boundaries. State law
enforcement authorities lack the expertise and resources to address multijurisdictional computer crimes. Nothing fills this gap.
Private companies tend not to expend resources to seek out computer criminals, and federal computer crime legislation tends to
be very specialized, narrowly addressing particular offenses. 73
The NSPA offers the courts an alternative. The statute is
designed to counter types of theft that prosper as a result of
enforcement problems created by state boundaries. By recognizing the application of "goods, wares [or] merchandise" to computer information, federal courts can provide a model for the
development of state law in the area, largely overcoming the
inevitable problem of the development of fifty separate bodies of
law. Furthermore, development of a body of law focused on com-

7' Kroh, 896 F2d at 1529.
' Meanwhile, state legislators have enacted a variety of laws designed to prevent
computer crime. These laws vary greatly from state to state. See Seth E. Lipner and
Stephen Kalman, Computer Law: Cases and Materials 539-44 (Merrill Publishing, 1989).
" For an argument that special legislation is not necessarily the proper response to
computer crime, see Colin Tapper, "ComputerCrime": Scotch Mist? 1987 Crim L Rev 5.
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puter files provides an analogue for future technologies. Moreover, federal recognition that computer files are a form of "property" may have positive effects in other now-emerging areas of
the law. For example, if a computer file is "property," Fourth
Amendment protections more easily apply. This Section develops
these arguments.
A. "Property" Under the NSPA
Courts look to law outside the NSPA to define what is property within the meaning of the Act. Generally, there are only a
few ways information can qualify as property under the NSPA.7 4
Dowling appears to foreclose copyright and patent law as avenues to status as statutory property, at least where the only
"theft" is infringement as defined by the copyright and patent
statutes. Generally, the most likely route to defining computer
trade secret law.7" Trade secret law
files as property is through
76
is a creature of state law.
Unfortunately, trade secret law is a patchwork of uncertain
case law developed in a variety of jurisdictions. The state law of
trade secrets, although made more uniform by the Restatement
of Torts' and Uniform Trade Secrets Act's informal codifications
of the area of law, is inconsistent and complex. 77 Trade secret
law became increasingly unpredictable in the 1980s and 1990s as
a result of rapid technological advancement.78
In general, to acquire trade secret protection a party must
show that the information is eligible for protection, is secret, and

"' Mike Godwin, Some "Property"Problems in Computer Crime Prosecution, Cardozo
Law Forum 24 (Aug 24, 1992).
' For a long time there was doubt whether a person had a "property" interest in
information protected as a trade secret. See Arthur H. Seidel and Ronald L. Panitch,
What the General PractitionerShould Know about Trade Secrets and Employment Agreements 12-13 (ALI, 1979), citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v Masland, 244 US 100
(1917). However, the Supreme Court recently held trade secrets to be property rights
protectable under the Constitution. Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co., 467 US 986, 1004 n 9
(1984); see also Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, UnderstandingIntellectual
Property Law § 3A at 3-4 (Matthew Bender, 1992).
76 Godwin, Cardozo Law Forum at 24 (cited in note 74). This Comment does not
address the more specialized case of breach of a confidential relationship.
" Chisum and Jacobs, Intellectual Property § 3A at 3-5 (cited in note 75). The Second
Restatement of Torts (1979) does not address the issue of trade secrets because, according
to the editors, trade secret law has developed sufficiently as a separate body of law.
However, tort principles still govern this body of law. See Amoco ProductionCo. v Lindley,
609 P2d 733, 743 n 4 (Okla 1980); Lipner and Kalman, Computer Law 208 (cited in note
72).
76 Chisum and Jacobs, Intellectual Property § 3A at 3-5 (cited in note 75).
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has commercial value. 9 As for eligible information, just about

any "concrete" information can qualify. 0 In cases of pure industrial espionage or outright theft, the misconduct may engender
sanctions regardless of whether the information technically qualifies as eligible, secret, and having commercial value.8
Although trade secret law is a body of law developed by
states, there are federal cases which have relied upon trade secret law to establish the property element of a federal crime. 2
For example, in United States v Bottone," trade secret law
formed the basis of a conviction under the NSPA for transporting
copies of information about the manufacturing process for bacterial cultures, as well as samples of the cultures themselves,
across state lines. Bottone is authority for the proposition that
stolen trade secrets can constitute the intangible portion of property as defined in the NSPA, whether or not there must also be
stolen physical property accompanying the intangible "property,,,84

The use of trade secret law to establish the property element
of a NSPA conviction is important for three reasons. First, trade
secret law has always been especially adaptive to new technologies. Trade secret law has evolved from its early nineteenth century ancestry significantly, if not primarily, in response to new
technologies.' Thus it seems particularly well-suited as a foundation upon which to build a law of computer file property protection.
Second, trade secret law adapts functionally, rather than
analogically-that is, it "reflects policy judgments about how to
encourage innovation, competition, and consumer welfare and
ethical notions about proper business behavior."86 A court would

Id § 3C at 3-14.
See id § 3C at 3-15 through 3-19 for a more thorough description of property
eligible for protection. A traditional requirement is that the information be more "concrete" than an idea, theory, possibility or emotion, and relatively specific in its intended
implementation. Many courts no longer focus on concreteness.
"' Id § 3A at 3-5. See, for example, ContinentalData Systems, Inc. v Exxon Corp., 638
F Supp 432, 441-43 (E D Pa 1986).
Godwin, Cardozo Law Forum at 24 (cited in note 74).
365 F2d 389 (2d Cir 1966). See the discussion of this case in text accompanying
notes 67-68.
' Whether Dowling overrules Bottone to the extent that Dowling may not have
allowed a conviction under the NSPA for transporting copies of the information alone is
unclear, but it does not affect this analysis.
Chisum and Jacobs, IntellectualProperty § 3A at 3-3 through 3-5 (cited in note 75).
8 Id § 3A at 3-4.
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not be steering a new course if it were to adapt trade secret principles to the world of computers using policy judgments as measuring sticks.
Third, courts should base the definition of property in the
NSPA on trade secret law because courts need more flexibility in
defining property than restrictive definitions provide. The Supreme Court rejected an argument that the word "stolen" in the
NSPA's predecessor was confined to any common law meaning."
More recently, in United States v Darrell, the Tenth Circuit rejected an argument that to meet the definition of "stolen," the
criminal act involved had to fall under the state statute's definition of "larceny," holding that the NSPA contemplated a broader definition." These decisions make clear that, at least when
interpreting the word "stolen," courts will not confine themselves
to specific state laws and precedents.8 9 The flexibility of trade
secret law provides breathing room for a court trying to give life
to a new form of property.
To summarize, the NSPA offers a convenient opportunity to
establish a common law foundation for defining property rights
in computer files so as to protect them against outright theft.
Courts have historically adapted trade secret law to new
technologies, they have done so functionally and not merely by
analogy, and the NSPA affords a court breathing room when construing the statutory definition of property. Section 2314 could
easily be read to cover theft of computer files given this framework.
B. The NSPA and Computer Files
Reading the NSPA to protect computer files as trade secrets
is a particularly good idea for two reasons. First, the purpose of
the NSPA was to provide a federal venue for crimes which took
advantage of state boundaries to hinder effective law enforcement. Computer crimes increasingly fit this description, and
computer criminals generally ignore the existence of state boundaries. Second, the extent to which a common law develops defin-

67

89

United States v Turley, 352 US 407, 417 (1956).
828 F2d 644, 649 (10th Cir 1987).
Presumably, the statutory language has even more leeway than recognized in these

cases. The Turley Court stressed that "stolen" had no common law meaning, leaving room
to consider the statute's purpose in defining the word. 352 US at 411-13. Similarly, the
current version of the Act uses the phrase "goods, wares [or] merchandise" and does not
include a single term such as "property" with an established common law meaning.
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ing computer file information as property will have a significant
impact on the extent to which courts recognize civil liberties in
the future. This is especially important because personal information is increasingly found in computer files. A government
victory in extending the NSPA to cover computer files as property
could prove to be one of the most significant civil liberties victories for the coming century.
1. A Federal Solution for National Crimes.
Congress has not yet addressed the issue of computer file
theft, and understandably so. When Congress enacted the original National Motor Vehicle Theft Act ("NMVTA")-the precursor
to the NSPA-the design for the personal computer was not even
on anyone's drawing board.90 The NSPA existed before computer
files appeared, and the new technology was simply dropped into
the lap of existing law. Computer technology is evolving quickly
enough that a statute crafted today and passed perhaps two
years from now might be obsolete upon birth.
The Dowling Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the
purpose of the NSPA when evaluating its applicability to copyright infringement. The purpose of the NSPA is a good starting
point for evaluating its application to computer files in the absence of language clearly resolving the issue.
Section 2314 came about as an extension of the NMVTA1
As the Court explained in United States v Turley, the
advent of the automobile U created a new problem with
which the States found it difficult to deal. The automobile
was uniquely suited to felonious taking whether by larceny,
embezzlement or false pretenses. It was a valuable, saleable
article which itself supplied the means for speedy escape.92
The automobile created new problems for which state laws were
inadequate. The Turley Court recognized that the automobile was
"the perfect chattel for modern large scale theft.' The challenge
the automobile presented could best be met through use of the
Federal Government's jurisdiction over interstate commerce.""3
90 National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub L No 102-483, 41 Stat 324, currently
codified at 18 USC § 2312 et seq (1990).
91 Id.

United States v Turley, 352 US 407, 413 (1957).
Turley, 352 US at 413, citing Hall, Theft, Law and Society, 235 (2d ed 1952), and
58 Cong Rec 5470-78 (1919).
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Congress expanded the NMVTA to the NSPA in order to extend
the protections of federal law to "roving criminals" who used
state boundaries to shield themselves from the jurisdictional
inadequacies of state law. As then Attorney General Cummings
put it, "It]hese criminals have made full use of the improved
94 Currently, the
methods of transportation and communication."
NSPA applies to all stolen property transported across state lines
with a value of $5,000 or more.
Society is becoming increasingly dependent on the use of
computers to store information previously stored in libraries and
filing cabinets. 5 Huge sums of money are transferred over networks, four of which carry the equivalent of the federal budget
every two to four hours. 6
Is there a risk of crime given this emerging architecture?
Judging from highly-publicized computer crime enforcement efforts, the computer crime problem might not seem very serious.97 For example, Operation Sundevil, a federal crackdown on
computer abuses in the Summer of 1990, has resulted in only one
conviction.98 The perception of the seriousness of computer crime
that does exist is likely the result of a media portrayal of computer crimes which in many cases tends to overstate the seriousness
of certain kinds of problems.9 9 Indeed, much of what is considered to be dangerous hacking is probably just harmless
pranksterism."'
But computer crime is becoming a serious problem. The
American Bar Association Task Force on Computer Crime conducted a study in 1984 on the impact of computer crime and concluded that annual losses from computer crime range between
$145 and $730 million. 1 ' Typical computer crimes include

" 78 Cong Rec 2947 (1934) (statement of Attorney General Cummings) (emphasis
added). See Dowling, 473 US at 220.
'5 See notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programsand Computer Rogues: Tailoring
the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 1, 2 n 4 (1990).
" See Lance Rose and Jonathan Wallace, Syslaw 105-07 (P.C. Information Group,
1992). Rose and Wallace describe how the major computer prosecutions of the day have
involved criminal acts which have resulted in relatively minor harm.
98 Id.
" The movie "Die Hard II," for instance, portrayed a group of criminals who gained
control of an airport's computers from a remote location and caused a commercial airplane
to crash.
"o Rose and Wallace, Syslaw at 106-07 (cited in note 97).
,o1ABA, Criminal Justice Section, Task Force on Computer Crime, Report on Computer Crime 38 (1984); Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured Response
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breaking into computer systems, stealing data, altering or destroying medical or financial data, spreading viruses,' gaining
unauthorized access to and misusing personal credit and other
personal and business information," 3 and similar ventures. 4
The increasing reliance on computers to store information ensures that the problem should grow significantly in the next decade. ' 5
The computer crime problem is national in scope. Unauthorized access to computers often occurs from a remote computer
over the telephone lines.' 6 Stolen telephone access codes, use of
call-forwarding through reprogramming switching stations, and
use of phantom phone billing rip-off strategies have rendered

long-distance charges an ineffective barrier to out-of-state and

out-of-country theft.' ' Hackers with criminal inclinations have
dealt a number of serious blows. Stories of hackers ignoring state
boundaries involve everything from invading computers at NASA
to stealing the credit information of everyone in a small town in
Oregon.0 8 All of this makes damaging industrial espionage possible. ' 9
The lack of federal criminal prosecutions for computer crime

does not mean that the problem is not serious. Prosecuting com-

to a GrowingProblem, 43 Vand L Rev 453, 454 (1990).
'0 The most famous virus to date was a "worm" launched onto the Internet by Robert
Morris, a Cornell graduate student. The worm crashed about 6,000 Internet computers.
Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 88-89 (cited in note 22).
" One company distributes a catalog boasting that it will sell confidential government computer information about anyone. Rob Johnson and Bill Husted, We Point Out
Weaknesses, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution Al (May 24, 1992).
"' Rose and Lance, Syslaw at 108 (cited in note 97).
'5
Note, 43 Vand L Rev at 454-55 (cited in note 101).
" Computer Fraud Legislation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 41-44 (1985) (statement of
William G. Petty).
"o, Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 49-52 (cited in note 22).
• See Richard Behar, Surfing off the Edge, Time 62 (Feb 8,'1993). One prank involved redirecting prison pay phone calls across state lines to a phone sex number. On
June 13, 1989, anyone at the Palm Beach County Probation Depatment in Delray Beach,
Florida, who called a certain probation officer found his call rerouted to a phone sex
worker named 'Tina" in New York. The switch was accomplished by a hacker who reprogrammed the software in a switching station. Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 98-99 (cited
in note 22). Other instances of crossing over state lines include gaining unauthorized access to White House and Pentagon computers. Mark Goodman, Hacker for Hire, People
151 (Oct 19, 1992).
,
Goodman, People at 151 (cited in note 108). Goodman recounts tales of Ian Murphy, a formerly mischievous hacker who now heads a consulting company which spies on
the hiring company to ensure competitors are not doing the same.
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puter crime is extremely difficult. Injured companies rarely pursue criminals, often because the offending party is usually financially judgment-proof."' Moreover, the enforced fragmentation
of the phone company has made tracking and prosecution of
phone criminals next to impossible."'
Generally, state prosecutors fare no better. Where the case
involves complicated issues which require a certain level of sophistication even to understand, requires research into tricky
multijurisdictional questions, or demands that one jurisdiction
devote resources to prosecute for crimes which affect other jurisdictions, law enforcement officers simply turn to the greener
pastures of well-established law." 2 One of the main problems
with locating and prosecuting serious computer criminals is the
lack of a centralized body with the resources and expertise necessary to confront what is an extremely complex type of crime."'
Local law enforcement officers lack the expertise and resources to
prosecute crimes of this nature."4 Making matters worse, this
area of law is not only fragmented at the state level,"' but also
uncertain," 6 which makes multijurisdictional prosecutions extremely difficult." 7 Creative forms of computer theft abound;
fragmentation makes law enforcement in this area nearly impossible.
Given the complex nature of computer crime, and the difficulties prosecuting multijurisdictional computer crimes with limited local resources and expertise, jurisdictional centralization is
necessary. Hence, extending the NSPA to cover theft via computer is entirely consistent with the purpose of the NSPA.

"' See Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 62 (cited in note 22) noting that "[hiackers are
generally teenagers and college kids not engaged in earning a living."
...Id at 183-84.
112 William Petty argues that these problems argue in favor of uniform federal preemptive legislation. Computer FraudLegislation Hearings at 41-43 (cited in note 106).
,,3 Id at 41-44.
114

Id.

Different states have passed different laws to address computer crime. These laws
are far from uniform. Lipner and Kalman, Computer Law at 539-44 (cited in note 72);
Douglas Reimer, American Bar Association, Tort and Insurance Practice Section, The Low
Side of High Tech (1985). For example, very few states, with the exception of New York,
have a statute prohibiting unauthorized copying of computer files or software. Branscomb,
16 Rutgers Computer & Tech J at 1 & 1 n 175 (cited in note 96); see also N Y Penal Law
§ 156.30 (McKinney 1988).
"' Ed Krol, The Whole Internet User's Guide and Catalog 34 (O'Reilly & Associates,
1992).
"' Computer Fraud Legislation Hearings at 41-44 (statement of Petty) (cited in note
106).
"'
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2. Broader Implications.
Even if enforcing the law were not a compelling reason for
extending coverage of the NSPA," 8 the advantages of recognizing property rights against theft of computer files go beyond
hindering serious industrial espionage. In fact, no one seriously
claims that the NSPA could ever serve as a panacea for all computer crime. But affirmative recognition of computer information
as property under the NSPA would be a good step in this uncertain area of law. What is at stake is not a new tool in the prosecutorial tool belt, but is far more fundamental: how we treat
computer information in an era where pen and paper are all but
obsolete.
a) Preserving existing property rights. The increasing
obsolescence of paper is no secret. Society is becoming
1
increasingly dependent on computers to store information."
More and more companies now store information about
customers in computer databases. 2 ' Information is traded like
any other good in the marketplace. 2 ' The most personal
medical data may soon be accessible with the use of what
resembles an automatic teller machine card.'2 2 Private
1
One might argue that the injured companies, rather than society, should bear the
cost of industrial espionage. This is a plausible argument, especially since countermeasures against minor intrusions into computer systems are relatively inexpensive (complicated passwords, levels of security access, data encryption, and even unplugging the
modem are all fairly inexpensive means of preventing some forms of unauthorized access).
However, relying on the injured company to bear the cost assumes that computer crime
imposes no external costs on society at large. The AT&T phone system crash of January
15, 1990 proves otherwise. See Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 1-2 (cited in note 22). Mistakes made when searching for files may accidentally crash a system. Serious injury to
companies imposes costs on those who depend on the company. However, it is not clear to
what extent private enforcement would be adequate.
19 Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 Harv L
Rev 1898, 1898-99 (1991); Office of Technology Assessment, Critical Connections:
Communicationfor the Future 275-80 (1990); Note, 43 Vand L Rev at 453-55 (cited in note
101).
12 Many companies now use a "caller-ID" service provided by the phone companies to
link information about the calling consumer with the caller's telephone number.
Companies such as Quaker Oats and Citibank have compiled databases with detailed
information on millions of households. See Anne W. Branscomb, Common Law for the
Electronic Frontier:Computers, Networks and Public Policy Scientific American 154 (Sep
1991).
121 Anne Branscomb argues that the market for information alone through on-line
databases represents about four billion dollars in trade each year. Branscomb, 16 Rutgers
Computer & Tech L J at 2 n 3 (cited in note 96).
12 An AT&T television commercial advertises that just such a system will be
available in the near future.
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information is available to anyone who can gain access to the
now vast computer files which keep records on nearly
everyone.'2 3 Add to this the fact that personal computers are
becoming commonplace in the household. Even the government is
entering the picture: several recent bills introduced in the House
of Representatives would require the government to post
information on federal bulletin boards.124 Legal databases available to anyone with a computer and a modem carry everything
from federal case law to obscure agency decisions.'2 5 Even general information available in libraries is now available with a
modem. 2 ' To the extent that property protection currently
available to data stored on paper is not extended to the same
information stored on a computer, society has abandoned
formerly available property rights merely because the information has been stored in a new container.
b) Corresponding privacy interests. The computer
revolution extends far beyond data storage and retrieval.
Electronic mail ("e-mail") has increased in popularity. People now
communicate over the computer, setting up "rooms" in which
they converse privately or publicly. Whole communities have
been established over the phone lines using computers. Many of
the people in these communities, who write to each other using email and talk to each other using what resembles an electronic
CB radio, have never met each other face-to-face. People even
play games, such as chess or modern forms of Dungeons and
Dragons, over the computer. Players know one another through

"2 See John Schwartz, Big Guns for Small Targets, Newsweek 63 (Nov 16, 1992). One
author recounts a tale of using a large commercial network to acquire the phone number
of Bob Dylan's ex-wife and information brokers to acquire Dan Rather's American Express
bills. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Privacy for Sale 29, 65-69 (Simon & Schuster, 1992).
" See Information Access by, of and for the People, CompuServe Magazine 7 (April
1993). Bills include the Improvement of Information Access Act (HR 3459), introduced by
US Rep Major Owens on Oct 1, 1991 (which would mandate that federal agencies make
better use of computer networks in releasing information), and a similar bill (HR 2772),
introduced by Rep. Charlie Rose, which would provide a Wide Information Network for
Data Online run by the GPO. Information available would likely include the SEC's
EDGAR system for corporate disclosure filings, the House of Representatives LEGIS
system and the DOJ's JURIS system. Information Access, CompuServe Magazine at 7
(April 1993).
1
Mead Data Central, which maintains a database known as "LEXIS," and West
Publishing Company, which maintains a database known as "Westlaw," now provide dialup databases which are all but essential to the practicing lawyer.
1
InformationAccess, CompuServe Magazine at 7 (cited in note 124).
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127
this interaction, and they have formed complex communities.
The location of these "communities" is even more complex.
They exist in the electronic memories of a computer or several
computers linked by a network such as "the net" (the
Internet). 121 In the very near future, when high speed phone
lines become commonplace, 29 a person will be able to put on
his head a virtual reality helmet which is plugged into his computer and, using his computer, communicate with people around
the country while a computer simulates a room and generates
images of the other participants. 3 ' The same technology will allow an employee to work at home, perhaps in another state. The
employee will be hooked into the company network; he will interact with others using such a helmet in the virtual reality of
the company's lavish computer-simulated offices, when in actuality the "company" is a computer program generated by a mainframe computer somewhere.' 3 ' In essence, this new "area" in

Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at xi-xiv (cited in note 22).
The Internet is actually "a globe-spanning system of perhaps 50,000 computers,
mainframes, minicomputers and workstations for the most part, all linked by ultra-highspeed telephone lines but accessible as well by ordinary computer users via slow-speed modems." James Coates, The network of networks beckons to determined on-line explorers,
Chicago Tribune Sec 7 p 4 (Apr 4, 1993). It was established by the Pentagon 20 years ago
and eventually assumed in part by the National Science Foundation ("NSFNET). The
connected computers are mainly run by universities, military installations, and major
businesses. However, many popular services such as CompuServe, America Online and
Prodigy provide limited access to the "net" through the use of electronic mail. Id. An
ordinary user instructs his personal computer to "dial up" the service or network computer by using a modem, and the user then interacts with programs run by the network
computer he calls. For more thorough description, see John S. Quarterman, The Matrix
(Digital Press, 1992); Ed Krol, The Whole Internet (cited in note 116).
1
The current network of phone lines, which still includes copper wiring, is incapable
of carrying high-speed data transmissions to ordinary households. Most modems communicate at a rate of about one to two pages of data every second. The line interference from
the old wiring prevents higher speeds. Fiber optic cables, cables made of thin strands of
glass so pure that you could see through a 70-mile-thick window of it, allow for much
faster transmission rates. The new cable can carry the contents of the entire Encyclopedia
Britannica every second. Telephone companies are currently working to replace the
copper wire with fiber optic cables. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Take a Trip into the Future
on the Electronic Superhighway, Time 50, 53 (Apr 12, 1993).
1
Virtual reality video games using such helmets already exist in the same video arcades that once boasted of games such as Pac Man. See Don Clark and Ken Siegmann,
Virtual Reality Coming to Arcades and Theme Parks, San Fran Chronicle C3 (Mar 16,
1993). The only obstacles to virtual reality phone conversations are time, money, and the
lack of high-speed phone lines, all of which are rapidly disappearing. See note 129 and
accompanying text.
.31See A Day in the Cyber Life, 2000 AD., CompuServe Magazine 14 (Dec 1992), and
a response to the article, Nina Adams, Commuting in 2000, CompuServe Magazine 4 (Mar
1993).
'
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which we store information, through which we are beginning to
interact, and on which we now increasingly depend is a new frontier.
William Gibson coined the term "cyberspace" for this new
frontier."2 Cyberspace presents a host of new legal problems;
until the late 1980s and early 1990s issues of property and privacy in cyberspace had not made a significant appearance in legal
culture. 13' And yet this new frontier is the battleground for civil
liberties as we will understand them in the next century. As
more and more of our lives require interaction with computers-communicating through computers over the phone lines,
using networks to store electronic mail, submitting to mammoth
databases which contain extremely personal information-these
issues will force themselves upon us.
Seen in this light, the issue of whether computer files are
property is pressing. The alternative to such a recognition is
problematic. If computer files are not considered property, they
are subject to attack. One potential attacker is the computer
hacker turned criminal. 134 The possibility of an attack on
networked computer systems is well known, and "pranks" have
had somewhat serious consequences. 3 ' These seemingly harmless excursions give hackers a bad name. Worse yet, they make
the general public timid of computers and computer networks. A
great deal of the Internet is publicly-funded. Sexually explicit
materials uploaded to a36public node once jeopardized the funding
of the entire NSFNET.1
If computer files are not considered property, the information
stored in them becomes unprotected, and the rights which usually attach to property are absent. All of the information people
store on network computers, from e-mail messages to term papers, is in control of someone other than the people who put it
there. When the government searches through someone's private
e-mail on a computer network, is it conducting a "search" as

132

See William Gibson, Neuromancer (Ace Books, 1984). Gibson is generally credited

with coining the term.
13 Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 57-58 (cited in note 22).
13 I use the term "hacker" pejoratively as an unfortunate convenience. Very few
"hackers" are actually troublemakers. The vast majority are bright, socially productive
and creative individuals. Id at 55, 77.
13 See notes 97 through 109 and accompanying text above.
Krol, The Whole Internet 35 (cited in note 116). The NSFNET is a significant
'
portion of the Internet system and is run by the National Science Foundation. See note
128.
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defined under the Fourth Amendment?. 3 What if the government reprograms the software which creates one of the predicted
virtual reality "rooms" so as to create an invisible observer to a
conversation? 8 What if a company reads its computer-users' email or private files? These questions are still unanswered.
To the extent that computer storage precludes otherwise
available property protections, computer storage of information
may defeat privacy protections.'39 If the data and files used in
e-mail or in creating a virtual reality "room" are considered the
property of the users, protection of privacy is more likely. "
Trade secret law can only be a springboard for recognizing a

's A recent decision awarded damages to plaintiffs against the U.S. Secret Service for
literally seizing the computers of a bulletin board run by Steve Jackson Games called the
Illuminati Bulletin Board. Steve Jackson Games Inc. v United States Secret Service, 816 F
Supp 432, 440 (W D Tex 1993). The Secret Service read and deleted some of the e-mail
stored on the computer. Although the court found for the plaintiffs, its holding was based
on the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act,
18 USC §§ 2701, et seq, which allows the government "disclosure" when "there is reason
to believe the contents of a[n] ... electronic communication are relevant to a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry." 18 USC §§ 2703 & 2703(d). The court's finding for the plaintiffs
was more the result of a bungled Secret Service operation than a recognition of property
right in stored electronic communications. The court held that the Secret Service should
have asked a magistrate first; that appears to have been its mistake. 816 F Supp at 443.
The "relevant" and "legitimate" language may offer a relatively low standard of protection
for these forms of communication.
'" Such an action would probably be covered under a 1986 amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See S Rep No 541, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 13 (1986)
("Section 101(a)(3) of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act amends the definition of
the term 'intercept' in current section 2510(4) of title 18 to cover electronic communications. The definition of 'intercept' under current law is retained with respect to wire and
oral communications except that the term 'or other' is inserted after 'aural.' This amendment clarifies that it is illegal to intercept the non-voice portion of a wire communication."); see also Steve Jackson Games, 816 F Supp at 441 (citing legislative history).
However, the Steve Jackson Games court concluded that the obstacles to the government's
search and seizure were purely statutory. Congress might easily change its mind and
even require operators of bulletin boards to disclose communications to the government. It
enacted a similar although misnamed law, the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires a bank
to retain and disclose information about its customers and their transactions to the
government. The statute was upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in United
States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (1976). Notably, the government does not even conduct a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment when it installs a pen register at the phone
company that records what number a person dials. Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 74546 (1979).
13 See Miller, 425 US 435, 443 (no protected privacy interest in bank records); Smith,
442 US 735, 745-46 (no privacy interest in telephone number dialed); Steve Jackson
Games, 816 F Supp at 443 (privacy interest in e-mail only statutory).
...The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed property interests as protected along with
privacy interests in Soldal v Cook County, Ilinois, 113 S Ct 538, 544 (1992). The Court
observed that interests in property and privacy are tied in Fourth Amendment analysis.
Id.
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broader notion of property and privacy rights in an electronic era.
At a minimum, it would shape societal expectations of interests
in computer information. Conversely, refusing to extend property
protection for trade secrets to computer files, relying exclusively
on statutory protections, may correspondingly serve as a framework for refusing to extend privacy protection to the new

frontier.14
One way to ensure privacy and a form of property interest in
computer files is by contract."' Indeed, the advantages of contract are clear in the context of bulletin boards. A system operator may ask users to follow certain standards relating to privacy
and courtesy; if the user does not like the standards the user
may go somewhere else or start her own bulletin board."'
The possibility of protection through contract does not mean
that we should fail to recognize property rights in computer information. Under trade secret law, or an expansion based upon that
foundation which recognizes broader rights in computer files, a
person could easily modify her rights, adding to or taking away
from what the law provides as a baseline.4 Additionally, relying upon contracts between the user and the company providing
e-mail to the user instead of relying upon a broad understanding
of property rights, provides less protection of Fourth Amendment
rights, which are based on societal expectations of what is rea4
sonable, not individual expectations."
The limits put on Fourth Amendment rights by a contract
scheme would have an effect on willingness to contract for a
recognition of privacy. Lance Rose argues that the diversity of
state privacy laws ensure that it is easier for a system operator,

"' See Soldal, 113 S Ct at 544-45 (privacy protection only extends as far as society
considers to be reasonable). The FBI is proposing legislation that would force computerized telephone and communication system companies and manufacturers to design into
their systems the capability to eavesdrop on digital communications. The Bureau claims
that the switch to digital communications will make wiretapping more difficult. However,
the extensive wiretapping machinery would make wiretapping much easier than it is
today. See John Eckhouse, FBI Talks About Tapping Computers, San Fran Chronicle D1
(Mar 12, 1993); Tim Weiner, Hard Times for the FBI's Wiretapping, Phil Inquirer A4 (Feb
7, 1993); FBI's Digital Wiretap Bill Assailed in GSA Internal Documents, Common Carrier
Week (Jan 25, 1993).
142 Rose and Wallace, Syslaw at 25-40 (cited in note 97).
141
I borrow this idea from Professor David Friedman.
'" David Bender, Protecting Computer Trade Secrets, Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 224 PLI/Pat 713 (May 1, 1986)
(Westlaw).
15 See Soldal, 113 S Ct at 544-45. As an example, a person cannot contract into an
expectation that the government will not search his person or effects without a warrant.
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who may have his system seized if someone stores an illegal file
on it, to monitor e-mail to ensure that it contains nothing bad.
Even if the system operator could contract for privacy, given the
diversity of state privacy laws in this area he will find it easier to
simply refuse to promise any privacy for e-mail whatsoever. 46
A federal baseline recognizing privacy rights in computer information would provide more comfort for system operators." 7
Thus, computer information faces a two-flanked attack. On
one flank stands the hacker turned criminal; on the other stands
the government and companies who provide e-mail services without respecting user privacy or property interests in the data.
Each threatens the interests and privacy we expect in information stored on a computer. The importance of protecting information against both flanks is summarized in an anecdote Bruce
Sterling recently reported: an AT&T employee, Charles Boykin,
set up at his own expense a publicly-available computer which
people could call using a modem. The system was so powerful
that people began to call it "Killer". He considered the venture
good advertisement for the new AT&T system. Killer eventually
acquired 1500 users who communicated, uploaded and
downloaded files and used the system for electronic mail.
But by 1990,... AT&T Corporate Information Security was
fed up with Killer. This machine offered no direct income to
AT&T and was providing aid and comfort to a cloud of suspicious yokels from outside the company, some of them actively malicious toward AT&T, its property, and its corporate
interests. Whatever goodwill and publicity had been won
among Killer's 1,500 devoted users was considered no longer
worth the security risk. On February 20, 1990, Jerry Dalton
arrived in Dallas and simply unplugged the phone jacks, to
the puzzled alarm of Killer's many Texan users. Killer went
permanently off-line, with the loss of vast archives of pro-

""
Lance Rose, Cyberspace and the Legal Matrix:Laws or Confusion? (available online
at efforg). This is not mere speculation. A bulletin board located in Illinois, AKCS, upon
signup warns the potential user that he should expect no privacy whatsoever. The concerned system operator noted that he filt the seizures of bulletin boards in the Riggs case
were in violation of the Constitution, but to play it safe he would monitor everything
closely. Rose and Wallace advise that: "The most surefire method [to guard against
system seizure due to illegal files being placed on your bulletin board] is to turn your BBS
into the equivalent of a well-lit and heavily guarded prison camp. Look through every
single message, private and public alike, and every file." Rose and Wallace, Syslaw at 125
(cited in note 97).
147

Id.
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grams and huge quantities of electronic mail; it was never
restored to service. AT&T showed no particular regard for
the "property" of these 1,500 people. Whatever "property" the
users had been storing on AT&T's computer simply vanished
completely.'48
As computers increasingly replace traditional media for storage of information, communication, and interaction generally,
what is at stake in defining the status of a computer file is
whether current notions of rights and powers travel with the
data into the computer world. Whether current federal laws can
adequately address new forms of computer crime if read to extend to the new forms of crime is unclear. However, preserving
existing property rights in the face of a new medium for storing
information which offers unique avenues to theft demands, at a
minimum, the same level of property protection that applied to
the former medium. Hence, the NSPA should be read to cover
theft of information stored on a computer, regardless of the method by which that information was stolen.
IV. APPLIED: THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION
Once one has property rights in the information contained in
a computer file, a host of new questions arise. The previous Section argued in favor of extending the NSPA to intangible information stored on a computer. This Section addresses the remaining question: assuming the NSPA applies to computer information, how should we place value on that information? The
NSPA applies where property "of the value of $5,000 or more" is
transported across state lines. Theft of computer files presents
special problems.
Consider the following hypothetical problem. A week before
the long-awaited release of GameCo's new virtual reality computer game, CyberHacker, X in Illinois, using his personal computer,
dials into GameCo's network in California, uses an unauthorized
password, and gains access to the source code for CyberHacker. X
downloads the source code file, uses a compiler program to compile the code into a working application and plays the game.'4 9
Sterling, Hacker Crackdown at 125-26, 141-42 (cited in note 22).
,4'As explained above, "downloading" means instructing the computer called to send
information over the phone lines to the caller. "Source code" is a text file containing a
computer program readable to human beings. "Compiling" means turning the source code
file into a program by translating it into binary language (the computer's language).
"Application" is another word for "computer program."
14
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Feeling particularly devious, he decides as a joke to upload the
source code file to a popular bulletin board in Texas used by
other hackers across the country. Upon releasing CyberHacker a
week later, the company finds that its sales do not even come
near their previously projected levels. In fact, GameCo sells only
a few packages. It turns out that most of GameCo's potential
customers are hackers who have already downloaded the source
code file and compiled it on their own. 50
Under this Comment's interpretation of Dowling, both X's
downloading and uploading of the source code file meet the first
two requirements of the NSPA: "goods, wares, [or] merchandise"
were transported or transmitted across state lines and they were
known to be "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." The remaining
issue, then, is valuation. The NSPA only applies to a particular
act of transporting property "of the value of $5,000 or more."' 5'
Is the property sent over the line worth $5,000?
The meaning of "value" in this context can take one of two
directions. First, "value" can refer to the value of the property if
it were otherwise in the hands of the victim. Second, "value" can
refer to the value of the property in the hands of the thief, in
other words evaluated in a "thieves' market."
The most commonly-employed method for valuation is the
thieves' market formula. The Seventh Circuit applied this approach in a case of stolen eight-track recording tapes, reasoning
that the profit margin from sale in the thieves' market was the
most the thieves could have obtained.'52 The thieves' market
approach has been applied in other cases of partially intangible
and partially tangible property. The Eleventh Circuit held that in
cases of pardally intangible stolen property this approach is preferred.'
'
This hypothetical set of facts is similar to an incident which occurred several years
ago. An organization known as the NuPrometheus League copied and distributed a
portion of Apple Computer's proprietary source code without compensation. Apparently, a
distaste for Apple's litigious nature spawned the act. Although no one is sure if any harm
came to Apple, the incident highlights the unique nature of computer crime. See Sterling,
Hacker Crackdown at 232-33 (cited in note 22).
151 Although the government can aggregate different shipments in some cases, see
United States v Berkwitt, 619 F2d 649, 656 (7th Cir 1980), I treat these two acts separately for purpose of analysis.
2 Berkwitt, 619 F2d at 657-58.
15 United States v Gottesman, 724 F2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir 1984). See also United
States v Sarro, 742 F2d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir 1984) (thief's belief as to potential earnings
is sufficient).
An analysis of whether this is the proper approach is beyond the scope of this
Comment. As a general matter, where the cost of catching and punishing an offender is $0
and all offenders are caught, punishment should be set at damage done (the cost to the

288

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

[1993:

It is important to realize that this applies only to a special
case: where the value in the thieves' market can be determined.
When such a market value cannot be determined, courts employ
other methods. Generally, expert testimony,"' the amount of
time and money invested in the scheme, and the amount spent to
develop the goods stolen, 155 are necessary to determine value.
Notably, the Fifth Circuit has held that without a market upon
which to base the value, other factors will not suffice. 55
Computer file theft presents unique problems in this area, as
the hypothetical case described above illustrates. To begin with,
in the particular hypothetical I have chosen, the file stolen was
not the object file, but rather the source code. While there may be
a discernable market for the compiled end product, there is no
such market for the source code. However, the source code may
actually be more valuable to the customers than the object code.
Many if not most of the recipients would be able to compile the
source code themselves. Presumably, many of the recipients of
the file could have altered the code for their own particular use.

victim). This deters all inefficient crimes. But since catching and prosecuting criminals is
costly, prosecuting crimes is efficient only to the extent that the net cost from the offense
occurring is greater than the cost of preventing it. The cost of preventing an offense may
be negative in that with each prosecution other crimes will be deterred. As fewer offenses
occur, society must spend less to catch and punish offenders. See David Friedman, Should
the Characteristicsof Victims and Criminals Count? Payne v Tennessee and Two Views of
Efficient Punishment 34 BC L Rev 731, 733-37 (1993). Hence, both value to victim and
value to thief will be relevant. Assume for purpose of analysis that there are no negative
costs from deterrence of additional inefficient crimes, and assume further that there are
no enforcement costs. If the total cost of prosecuting a criminal under the Act is $4,999,
then prosecuting him makes sense only if the total social loss prevented by that prosecution is $5,000 or greater. Therefore both value to the victim and value to the thief will be
relevant: a decision to commit social resources to prosecute a crime depends, at least
partially, on social loss. Social loss is, in a very simple sense, value of the property stolen
to the victim minus value of that property to the thief. Value to the thief tells us at what
level to set the punishment in order to deter him, but it does not tell us what the social
loss from the crime is (since the value to the victim may be $5,001 or $20,000). Value to
the victim, likewise, does not measure social loss (since the value to the thief may be $10
or $4,900). Hence, since the jurisdictional limit appears to be concerned with preventing
waste of society's resources, see United States v Shaffer, 266 F2d 435 (2d Cir 1959), affd,
362 US 511 (1960), we know at a minimum that both values will be relevant.
" See, for example Greenwald, 479 F2d at 321; Lester, 282 F2d at 754; Seagraves,
265 F2d at 880.
" See Michael A. Epstein, National Stolen PropertyAct, in Model Intellectual Property, ch 3, II.A. (1991); Seagraves, 265 F2d at 880; United States v Drebin, 557 F2d 1316,
1318 (9th Cir 1977).
1 6 Abbott v United States, 239 F2d 310, 313 (5th Cir 1956) ("Mere cost of production,
cost of replacement, value to the owner ....
is not market value. For that value-market-depends on a market, whether formal or informal, in which willing buyers
bargain with willing sellers.").
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Also, it may have provided them with the means to clandestinely
develop their own virtual reality games. Expert testimony would
be needed to determine the value of the source code file.
A different problem arises in X's decision to upload the file to
a bulletin board. While X only posted the file once, each time
someone downloaded the file, GameCo suffered an additional
loss. 5

Assuming X had sold the file to individual buyers, X

would have earned money on each sale. But one need not look to
the value the company places on the source code to address this
problem. Since copying the file qualifies as taking of property,
each act of copying is reasonably seen as a separate transfer of
property. It is reasonable, therefore, to calculate the value of the
good based on the number of copies downloaded.
Further complicating this analysis is X's decision to distribute the code for free. X never, in a conventional sense, received
any monetary value for distributing the source code. But this
statement is incomplete, for X did receive some value in placing
the file onto the bulletin board. Theoretically, X made a decision
that in distributing the file for free he would end up in a better
position than if he had sold the file to someone else or sold it to
end users outright. Thus X did receive a benefit; the only question is how to translate that benefit into monetary terms.
Applying hypothetical amounts of money to these conclusions, the determination might be made as follows. First assume
the compiled application with accompanying documentation retails for $110. Assume expert testimony establishes that buyers
of the stolen good would be willing to pay $100 for a copy of the
source code without documentation-the expert assumes that
those who would buy it are able to compile it easily, can acquire
third-party documentation relatively cheaply, and see independent value in having the source code because they know how to
alter it. Also, assume that it can be established that a total 51
people downloaded the file, and that is the total number of people
who would be willing to buy the stolen file. Assume further that
X could have easily found a willing buyer for his only copy of the
code who would be willing to distribute the code on his own (assume X adheres to a hacker's code of ethics and will not retain a
copy for himself).

.. GameCo suffers at least two losses every time someone acquires an unauthorized
copy of the source code. First, GameCo loses a potential sale of the product. Second, a new
potential competitor of GameCo is able to compete unfairly with GameCo by avoiding a
great deal of the cost of developing the product.
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Since we do not know how much value X derived from uploading the file to the bulletin board, but can reasonably assume
that it is more than the value of selling the source code file to
one individual who could distribute for $100 each the file to 51
people (with $0 in transaction costs),'58 the value to X must
have been at least $5,099. Under these facts, a jury might conclude that the value of the stolen property in a thieves' market
meets the statutory threshold.
In these cases, there can be no simple answer to the question
of value. Expert testimony will be necessary. The above analysis
serves only as an example solution to one problem and a list of
questions to ask in similar cases. Computer file crime forces the
recognition that new forms of property require new approaches in
questions of valuation.
CONCLUSION

The NSPA attempts to solve the shortcomings of state theft
laws as applied to property which easily migrates across state
lines. Courts have applied the NSPA to property that is, for all
practical purposes, entirely intangible. The Supreme Court, in
Dowling, held that copyright infringement alone is not sufficiently like stealing to meet the statutory requirement that the property be "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." However, to read
Dowling as a case which applies to all intangible property would
be to render application of the NSPA anomalous: a thief can
easily avoid federal prosecution by merely copying the intangible
property onto his own tangible medium. The theft of computer
files provides an excellent example of a case in which such an
anomaly could frequently arise. Because it is plausible to reasonably distinguish mere copyright infringement from using illicit
means to acquire a computer file, the NSPA should be read to
apply to computer file theft. When read this way, new problems
of valuation arise. However, existing case law provides the means
to overcome these problems.
Unauthorized acquisition of a computer file is different from
stealing a car. But this should not necessarily require the enactment of an entirely new statute for every type of computer crime.
One alternative, and a good starting point, in an era when com-

I make this assumption only to simplify the analysis. The assumption is unrealistic. X probably would have incurred significant costs in locating a buyer for the package
who would be willing to distribute it at a profit.
1"
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puters will repace paper as a medium of storage, is the simple
recognition that these cases involve a new form of property, and
a new form of theft.

